Why Aren’t Syrian Refugees in Jordan Returning to the “New Syria”?
Zaatari camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan Source: www.annahar.com
Jamal Shalabi, Professor of Political Science at Hashemite University and a partner in the GAPs project, has published a compelling op-ed in the Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar. The piece explores why, despite the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of a new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa in December 2024, Syrian refugees in Jordan are hesitant to return.
Shalabi argues that the regime change was seen by many as more than a mere political shift—it symbolized the possibility of restoring a place in national life for long-excluded segments of society, especially refugees scattered across the region. Yet, nearly seven months into the Sharaa government’s rule, return numbers remain low. As of May 2025, the UN estimates only 500,000 Syrians have returned from abroad—of whom just 65,680 returned from Jordan, a small fraction of the 1.4 million Syrians estimated to be in the country.
The op-ed identifies four interlinked reasons behind this cautious stance:
1. The Nature of the New Regime: While presenting itself as a reformist force, the new regime is marked by a radical secular-jihadist ideology that remains unsettling for many refugees and external observers. Its lack of stable foundations and untested governance raises fears that it may be temporary or unstable, causing many to view the new authority as fragile and potentially volatile.
2. Security Concerns: Despite the leadership change, security remains uncertain, especially in areas like Daraa and Sweida—home to significant numbers of refugees in Jordan. These regions have experienced ongoing unrest and armed resistance, including refusals by key military groups to integrate into the new national army. The situation fuels hesitation, particularly among the estimated 239,000 refugees from Daraa alone.
3. Economic Fragility: Syria continues to suffer the devastating effects of 14 years of conflict. Infrastructure is in ruins, resources are scarce, and many skilled workers have left. In contrast, many Syrian refugees in Jordan have integrated into the local economy, aided by policies such as the issuance of over 430,000 work permits. Returning to a war-torn economy, especially for those who have built livelihoods in Jordan, poses a serious risk.
4. Generational and Psychological Distance: Over 214,000 Syrian children have been born in Jordan since the war began. This “new generation” has no lived memory of Syria and often knows it only through stories or media. For them, Syria is not a homeland to return to—it is a place they’ve never known. Encouraging return among this cohort poses a particular challenge.
Shalabi concludes that while the fall of Assad marked a political turning point, it has not provided sufficient guarantees for large-scale voluntary return. The decision to go back is entangled in complex political, economic, security, and emotional factors. Recent surveys from 2025 show that 72% of Syrians in Jordan do not wish to return, suggesting that—even if Syria changes—return may not be seen as a viable option. As the saying goes, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”
Read the full article (in Arabic):
لماذا لا يعود اللاجئون السوريون في الأردن إلى سوريا الجديدة؟