Deadlock in Morocco and the European Union on Readmission and Alternative Forms of Cooperation
by: Mehdi Lahlou, AMI
Issue of Readmission in EU-Morocco Relations: A Difficult Partnership
Morocco occupies a strategic position south of the Strait of Gibraltar, at the crossroads of migratory routes between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. This geographical location confers upon Morocco both a pivotal role in migration flows and significant political leverage in its negotiations with the EU. Consequently, Rabat claims a differentiated treatment compared with other African states.
Since 2000, the European Union (EU) has aimed to establish a readmission agreement with Morocco[1]. Such an agreement would facilitate the return of both Moroccan nationals and third-country nationals (TCNs) transiting through Moroccan territory who are deemed undesirable within the EU. After more than twenty years of negotiations, no agreement has been signed. The main stumbling block appears to be the EU’s demand that Morocco also readmit TCNs, a request Rabat has consistently refused on political, economic, and diplomatic grounds. This situation underscores the limitations of a European approach overly focused on readmission and highlights the need for a more balanced and comprehensive strategy. This piece analyses the causes of this deadlock, the strategic role of Morocco in Euro-African migration dynamics. It proposes avenues for reinventing the partnership to make it mutually beneficial.
Rescue operation carried out by the Irish Defence Forces as part of Operation Triton, on 15 June 2015. This rescue is believed to have taken place in the Mediterranean, off the Italian coast, potentially near Lampedusa, where Frontex has a mandate. Irish Defence Forces, June 15, 2015
EU–Morocco Negotiations
Following a mandate in 2000, the EU began negotiations on a European Union Readmission Agreement (EURA) with Morocco as part of its external migration policy. In 2013, the EU and Morocco signed a “Mobility Partnership”, which restarted discussions on readmission and made it easier for Moroccan citizens to get visas. However, as of 2025, no agreement has been reached, despite several financial incentives, cooperation proposals, and possible accords between the two parties.
The main obstacle to an agreement is the clause related to TCNs. The EU requires Morocco to accept the return not only of its own nationals but also of TCNs, which it believes to have passed through Moroccan territory, which the latter does not necessarily agree with. For Morocco[2], this clause constitutes the central obstacle, for several reasons: 1) A perception of disproportionate responsibility for the processing and reintegration of migrants. 2) The considerable financial, social, logistical, and political costs involved. 3) The risk of weakening Morocco’s alliances with several African countries -alliances essential for defending its economic and diplomatic positions on the continent, particularly in West Africa, with which Morocco maintains longstanding religious, intellectual, and political ties. Accordingly, Rabat perceives the TCN clause as impracticable and politically unacceptable, rendering the agreement impossible in its current form.
The EU has often sought to link readmission to incentives, such as visa facilitation for Moroccan citizens and financial contributions to development policies in the country. However, this approach has several shortcomings, including: 1) Legal mobility, as envisaged under the 2013 Mobility Partnership[3], has remained limited for Moroccans and is insufficient to offset the obligations tied to readmission 2) Financial and technical incentives do not compensate for the political and diplomatic risks Rabat would incur. 3) Readmission agreements already signed, or under negotiation, with other African countries of origin or transit (particularly of origin) render redundant the signing of a similar agreement with Morocco concerning the return of non-Moroccan nationals.
Thus, the EU’s approach—narrowly focused on readmission and financial incentives—has exposed its limitations. It fails to recognise Morocco’s actual situation as a state unable to bear the shared “migration burden” that the EU is unwilling to take on. Nor does it consider the causes of migration from Africa or address issues surrounding regional and continental cooperation in this area.
Alternative Forms of Cooperation
Despite the failure of readmission negotiations, the EU continues to promote security cooperation and border control as a “model” partnership—particularly with Tunisia, or, in Italy’s case, with Libya. However, such a cooperation relies primarily on coercion and surveillance, at the expense of mutual trust. A relationship focused exclusively on security risks undermines the legitimacy of the partnership and erodes cooperation in other strategic fields, such as education, health, climate change mitigation, the economy, or legal mobility. For the partnership to be sustainable, its scope must be broadened to include solutions that generate reciprocal benefits for both the EU and Morocco, and more broadly, for Europe and Africa as a whole.
According to us, the new forms of cooperation should consider, at least, four points: 1) Rebalance the Euro-Moroccan, Euro-Mediterranean, and African Partnership. This means that migration cooperation should not be confined to readmission or border control. Broader dimensions should be included: legal mobility, education, economy, climate, security, and more; 2) Abandon the TCN clause. This redundant and unworkable requirement should be removed from negotiations. Efforts should instead focus on realistic mechanisms for the return of Moroccan nationals only; 3) Provide genuine incentives, for example, move beyond mere visa facilitation by developing pathways for legal mobility (study, employment, professional exchanges) and foster genuine reciprocity in mobility regimes between the EU and Morocco; 4) Draw inspiration from flexible bilateral practices. Some Member States, such as Germany and Spain, have tried pragmatic solutions tailored to their relations with Morocco. The EU should build on these historical experiences—similar to those developed with Italian, Portuguese, or Greek migrants—rather than enforcing a uniform and inflexible approach in its dealings with the Maghreb, and Morocco in particular.
Conclusion
Twenty-five years of deadlock have demonstrated that a European strategy based on coercion and financial incentives is ineffective. To move forward, the EU should:
Adopt a more balanced approach that takes Morocco’s strategic interests into account.
Prioritise cooperation in domains beyond readmission, notably legal mobility, the economy, education, and security.
Consider readmission not as an end in itself, but as a tool integrated within a broader political and economic relationship between Rabat and Brussels.
Ultimately, only a pragmatic, reciprocal, and multidimensional approach can transform a stalled partnership into a sustainable and mutually beneficial cooperation.
References:
[1] Kevin Kaiser, ‘’EU-Morocco Negotiations on a Readmission Agreement: Obstacles to a Successful Conclusion’’. College of Europe. EU Diplomacy Papers 7/2019 .
[2] Media24, June 10, 2021. https://medias24.com/chronique/accord-communautaire-de-readmission-une-approche-securitaire-europeenne-face-a-la-demarche-globale-du-maroc/. In French.
[3] European Union, ‘’Migration and mobility partnership signed between the EU and Morocco’’. Brussels, June 7, 2013. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_13_513
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